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Predicting intentions to fake in psychological testing: Which normative beliefs are 
important?
Rachel Grievea* and Catherine McSwigganb
aUniversity of Tasmania, Australia
bAustralian Catholic University, Australia
A B S T R A C T
While previous research has examined the utility of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) in relation to 
intentions to fake in psychological testing, the current research extended the TPB model to empirically 
assess the role of moral norms and ethics. A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted (N = 225). In 
step 1, attitude, perceived behavioral control, and subjective norm significantly predicted intention to fake, 
although only attitude and perceived behavioral control were significant individual predictors, with 52.3% 
of variance explained. In step 2, addition of moral obligation norms significantly improved predicted 
intention to fake and explained an additional 14% of variance. In step 3, ethical position explained no 
additional variance. Future research should consider specific applicant faking scenarios or a behavioral 
outcome measure. It is concluded that personal, moral norms, rather than other-centred norms, are 
valuable when predicting faking intentions, and that integration of existing theoretical models of faking is 
indicated.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Production by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved. 
La predicción de la intención de falsear las respuestas en los tests psicológicos: 
¿qué creencias normativas son importantes?
R E S U M E N
Mientras la investigación precedente ha analizado la utilidad de la Teoría de la Conducta Planificada (TCP) 
en la intención de falsear los resultados de los tests psicológicos, esta investigación amplía el modelo de la 
TCP para evaluar qué papel juegan las normas morales y la ética. Se realizó un análisis de regresión jerár-
quica múltiple (N = 225). En el paso 1 la actitud, el control conductual percibido y la norma subjetiva pre-
decían de modo significativo la intención de falseamiento, aunque solo los dos últimos de modo significati-
vo, con un 53.3% de la varianza explicada. En el paso 2, la adición de las normas de obligación moral 
mejoraba significativamente la intención de falseamiento predicha, explicando otro 14% de varianza. En el 
paso 3 la posición ética no añadía varianza explicada. La investigación futura tendría que considerar los es-
cenarios de falseamiento por parte de los aspirantes o una variable resultado conductual. Se concluye que 
las normas morales personales antes que las normas centradas en los demás son las que cuentan a la hora 
de predecir la intención de falsear y se propone integrar los modelos teóricos sobre falseamiento.
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Producido por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos reservados.
Self-report personality tests are commonly used for vocational 
selection and clinical purposes. However, the validity of psychological 
tests is challenged by studies which demonstrate that individuals are 
able to alter their honest responses to present themselves strategically, 
for example by faking good or faking bad (e.g., Grieve & de Groot, 2011; 
Grieve & Mahar, 2010; Rogers, 2008). As distorted test responses may 
change selection and treatment decisions (e.g., Christiansen, Rozek, & 
Burns, 2010; Morgeson et al., 2007; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 
1998), identification of the characteristics which facilitate faking 
behavior is indicated. However, to date little research has examined 
the psychosocial predictors of intention to fake on psychological 
assessment. McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) application of the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) suggests that attitude toward faking, 
subjective norm regarding faking behavior, and perceived behavioral 
control over faking explains a significant proportion of variance in 
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faking behavior. The current research aimed to extend the 
understanding of faking behavior by examining, for the first time, the 
incremental role of moral obligation norms and ethical ideologies in 
forming intentions to fake during personality testing.
Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) proposed that 
intention to undertake a particular behavior can be predicted by a 
combination of attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral 
control toward the behavior. Attitude reflects an individual’s 
evaluation of the behavior as favourable or unfavourable. Subjective 
norm relates to the degree of social pressure the individual feels to 
engage in, or suppress, the behavior. Perceived behavioral control 
represents how easy, or how difficult, the individual perceives it 
would be to successfully perform the behavior in terms of their own 
abilities and external constraints. A favourable attitude, combined 
with a positive subjective norm and greater perceived behavioral 
control, should strengthen behavioral intention. In turn, strong 
intention increases the likelihood that the individual will perform 
the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). The TPB has received considerable 
empirical support (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2001; Rivis, Sheeran, & 
Armitage, 2009). Ajzen (1991) acknowledged that the contribution 
made by each TPB predictor of intention is expected to vary 
depending on the type of behavior.
The TPB has shown applicability to activities involving deception, 
including cheating on an exam, shoplifting, and lying (Beck & Ajzen, 
1991). McFarland and Ryan (2006) found that over two studies, 45-
57% of variability in intention to fake when applying for a job could 
be predicted by a combination of attitude, perceived behavioral 
control, and subjective norm regarding faking behavior. These results 
suggest that the TPB is a sound, basic model for studying faking 
intentions. However, a large amount of variance remains unexplained. 
In addition, McFarland and Ryan did not consider the potential role 
of additional normative values.
The Role of Moral Norms in the Theory of Planned Behavior
Subjective norms as assessed by traditional TPB approaches do 
not address the potential influence of other normative belief 
categories (Armitage & Conner, 2001). Moral norms are dependent 
on an individual’s personal view of what constitutes ethical behavior 
(Conner & Armitage, 1998). Moral norms appear to be a useful 
addition in predicting intention to engage in ethically value-laden 
behaviors over and above the basic TPB model, with a review finding 
an additional 4% of variance explained across 11 TPB studies (Conner 
& Armitage, 1998). Godin, Conner, and Sheeran (2005) concluded 
that for morally relevant behaviors, moral norms play an important 
role. More recently, moral norm has also demonstrated an influence 
on intentions beyond the traditional TPB components in value-laden 
behaviors such as recycling (White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade, & 
McKimmie, 2009) and unsafe driving (Elliott & Thomson, 2010). 
Given the usefulness of moral norms in examining value-laden 
behaviors in the context of faking a psychological test, considering 
the role of moral norms may also be relevant. It is unsurprising that 
a number of theoretical faking models propose that morality and 
values predict faking behavior. Goffin and Boyd (2009) presented a 
model that proposed that addition consideration of the role of moral 
codes in faking is indicated. McFarland and Ryan (2000) suggested 
that values and morals might influence faking beliefs and intentions 
to engage in faking behavior. Snell, Sydell, and Lueke (1999) also 
recommended that the role of morality be considered in applicant 
faking behavior. However, despite the intuitive appeal of morality as 
a possible variable of interest in faking and these theoretical 
proposals, the effect of morality on intentions to fake in psychological 
testing is yet to be empirically examined. In fact, to date, only one 
study (Grieve, 2012) has empirically considered the role of morality 
in regards to faking, and in that study, assessment of morality was 
only indirect, with honest-humility acting as a proxy measure. Grieve 
found that when considered with other personality variables, lower 
levels of honesty-humility significantly predicted intentions to fake 
in psychological assessment. However, once additional variables 
were included, honesty-humility was no longer a significant 
predictor. Grieve’s findings point to the fact that a variable such as 
honesty-humility, while associated with moral principles may not 
capture the nuances of the moral norms, at least as in regards to the 
value-laden behavior of faking. The current research aimed to 
address the gap in the literature regarding moral norms.
Additional Considerations: Ethical Position
Related to the field of morality is ethics. Schlenker (2008) 
conceptualised ethical position as an individual’s moral orientation 
to drive decisions on what is right or wrong. Schlenker and Forsyth 
(1977) proposed that ethical judgment could be described using two 
dimensions: ethical idealism and ethical relativism. High ethical 
idealism is characterised by a belief that there is a single, morally 
correct choice that can be made in any situation, while high ethical 
relativism is characterised by a more reflective approach that takes 
into consideration the specifics of the situation (Forsyth, 1980). Thus, 
within the current research context, it could be argued that for 
individuals with a high idealistic ethical position, the intention to 
fake is less likely. For example, an individual with a high idealistic 
ethical position may believe that all lying is wrong, and thus lying on 
a psychological test to get a job would also be wrong. In contrast, for 
those high in ethical relativism, more positive intentions towards 
faking are possible. For example, an individual with a high relativistic 
ethical position may believe that although lying is not desirable, 
lying on a psychological test to get a job that will allow them to take 
better care of a family member in need is acceptable.
The Current Research
Previous research suggests that TPB may serve as a useful 
framework for the investigation of intentions to fake on a psychological 
test (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). Further, a corollary of the nature of 
subjective norms in regards to value-laden behaviors implies that 
additional consideration of moral norms is indicated (Godin et al., 
2005). These findings align with theoretical models that propose that 
morality may predict the intention to fake on psychological tests 
(Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999). The 
current research sought to align these theoretical approaches, and, for 
the first time, to provide an empirical test of them. In addition, it was 
hoped that including ethical values might also provide an enriched 
understanding of the predictors of faking intention.
In line with McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) study, it was firstly 
hypothesised that the TPB variables of combination of attitudes 
towards faking, perceived behavioral control over faking, and 
subjective norm regarding faking behavior would significantly 
predict intention to fake on psychological tests. Specifically, it was 
anticipated that a favourable attitude, a high level of perceived 
behavioral control over faking, and a positive subject norm regarding 
faking would be related to increased intention to fake. Secondly, it 
was hypothesised that considering the role of moral obligation and 
ethical position would explain a significant amount of additional 
variance to the model, with a low moral obligation to avoid faking, 
lower levels of ethical idealism, and higher levels of ethical relativism 
related to increased intention to fake in psychological testing.
Method
Participants
Survey responses were received from 225 community members 
(56 male, 169 female). Twenty-four percent were aged 18-25, 13% 
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were 26-35, 28% were 36-45, 21% were 46-55, 7% were 56-65 and 8% 
were over 65.
Design
A cross-sectional, correlational design was used, with analysis 
conducted via hierarchical multiple regression. In the first step, the 
predictor variables were attitude to faking, perceived behavioral 
control over faking, and subjective norm regarding faking behavior. 
In the second step, moral obligation norm was added as a predictor. 
In the final step, ethical idealism and ethical relativism were added 
as predictors. The criterion variable was intention to fake.
Materials
Demographics. Information was requested for age and gender.
Theory of planned behavior constructs. Items testing the TPB 
were developed based on McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) model of 
faking behavior, and Beck and Azjen’s (1991) exploration of cheating, 
shoplifting, and lying intentions.
Attitude toward faking. Participants indicated how much each of 
eight semantic-differential items reflected their views about faking 
on psychological tests. A sample statement is Faking on psychological 
tests is: good-bad. Five items were reverse-scored. Scores were 
summed: higher scores indicate a more favourable attitude towards 
faking. Internal reliability in the current sample was good (Cronbach’s 
α = .83).
Perceived behavioral control over faking behavior. Perceived 
behavioral control was measured through five items using a 5-point 
Likert-type scale with the anchors 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = 
strongly agree. A sample item is It would be easy for me to fake 
responses to a psychological test. One item was reverse-scored. Scores 
were summed, with high scores indicating high levels of perceived 
behavioral control over faking behavior. The current sample 
suggested good internal reliability for this measure (Cronbach’s α = 
.83).
Subjective norm concerning faking behavior. Subjective norm 
was measured through two items, using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. A sample item is 
No-one who is important to me would care if I faked on a psychological 
test. Scores were summed: high scores indicate favourable subjective 
norm regarding faking behavior. Inter-item correlations in the 
current sample suggested good internal reliability (r = .81).
Moral obligation norm concerning faking behavior. Moral 
obligation was measured through two items assessing personal 
position towards engaging in faking behavior, using a 5-point Likert-
type scale with anchors of 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree. A sample (reversed) item is Even if I had a good reason, I could 
not bring myself to fake responses on a psychological test. High scores 
indicate a low moral obligation to suppress faking behavior. Inter-
item correlation in the current sample was acceptable (r = .61).
Intention to fake. Intention to fake was measured through four 
items using a 5-point Likert-type response format ranging between 
1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. A sample item from four 
items was I intend to fake on future psychological tests, with scores 
summed and higher scores representing a greater intention to fake. 
Cronbach’s α in the current sample (.88) suggested very good internal 
reliability.
Ethical position. Ethical position was measured using Forsyth’s 
(1980) Ethics Position Questionnaire. The scale uses a 9-point Likert-
type response format ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 9 = 
completely agree. Two 10-item sub-scales identify an individual’s 
ethical position: idealistic or relativistic. Sample items are One should 
never psychologically or physically harm another person (ethical 
idealism), and Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the action (ethical relativism). 
High mean sub-scale scores indicate a high level of idealism or 
relativism respectively. Internal reliabilities are good, with Cronbach’s 
α of .88 for ethical idealism and .85 for ethical relativism in the 
current sample.
Procedure
Ethical clearance was obtained from the University’s ethics 
committee. Potential participants were then invited to participate in 
a survey investigating “individual differences in psychological 
testing”. After giving informed consent, participants completed the 
measures, before being debriefed and given the opportunity to have 
any questions answered.
Results
There was a small amount of missing data, thus, cases were 
excluded listwise, leaving data from 218 participants in the analysis. 
All relevant multivariate assumptions were met. Descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the correlations between variables. There were 
small to moderate positive correlations between the TPB predictor 
variables of attitude, perceived behavioral control, and subjective 
norm, while all TPB variables were moderately and positively related 
to intention to fake. Moral obligation norms were strongly related to 
intention to fake. Ethical idealism shared small and negative 
relationships with the TPB variables. Ethical relativism was only 
weakly correlated with all other variables.
In Step 1 of the hierarchical multiple regression, the combination 
of attitude, perceived behavioral control, and subjective norm 
significantly predicted intention to fake, R = .73, R² = .53, F(3, 214) = 
80.38, p < .001 (adjusted R square = .52) , accounting for 52.3% of 
variability in intention to fake. These results represent a very large 
effect, ƒ2 = 1.12 (Cohen, 1992). Within the model, attitude and 
perceived behavioral control were significant individual predictors, 
with more positive attitudes and greater perceived behavioral 
control related to increased intention to fake. Subjective norm was 
not a significant individual predictor.
In Step 2, moral obligation norm was added to the model. This 
significantly improved the model, explaining an additional 14% of 
variance, R² change = .14, Fchange (1, 213) = 88.63, p < .001, resulting 
in a model that explained 66.2% of variance in the intention to fake, 
R = .82, R² = .67, F(4, 213) = 107.13, p < .001, (adjusted R square = .662). 
This was an extremely large effect, ƒ2 = 2.03 (Cohen, 1992). Attitude, 
perceived behavioral control, and moral obligation were significant 
individual predictors of intention to fake, with more positive 
attitudes towards faking, greater perceived control over faking, and 
less moral obligation to suppress faking, associated with increased 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics
Variable M SD
Intention to fake 8.50 3.27
Attitude 14.60 5.74
Perceived behavioral control 14.02 4.38
Subjective norm 5.36 2.04
Moral obligation norm 4.22 1.76
Ethical idealism 6.83 1.33
Ethical relativism 5.33 1.46
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intention to fake. Subjective norms did not significantly contribute to 
the model.
In the third and final step, idealistic and relativistic ethical 
position were added to the model. This explained virtually no 
additional variance in the intention to fake, R² change = .00, Fchange 
(2, 211) = 0.14, p = .874. This final model explained 65.9% of variance, 
R = .82, R² = .67, F(6, 211) = 70.89, p < .001, (adjusted R square = .659). 
This was an extremely large effect, ƒ2 = 2.03 (Cohen, 1992). Significant 
individual predictors were unchanged from the previous step. Details 
of the regression analyses are presented in Table 3.
Discussion
As hypothesised, attitudes towards faking and perceived 
behavioral control over faking significantly predicted intention to 
fake on psychological tests; however, subjective norm was not a 
significant individual predictor to the model. Also as hypothesised, 
the addition of moral obligation explained significantly more 
variance in intention to fake, over and above the variance explained 
by the traditional TPB variables. However, in contrast to predictions, 
the inclusion of ethical position explained no additional variance.
Overall, while the combination of the basic TPB variables 
predicted faking intentions in this sample, subjective norm was a 
weak contributor to the model. This finding is in line previous 
research regarding intentions to perform dishonest actions such as 
cheating, shoplifting, and lying (Beck & Ajzen, 1991), and faking on 
psychological tests (McFarland & Ryan, 2006), where the contribution 
made by subjective norm was the lowest. However, unlike previous 
research, the current results did not reveal a significant effect of 
subjective norm. A possible explanation may come from the sample 
tested here: both Beck and Ajzen (1991) and McFarland and Ryan 
(2006) reported on data collected entirely from student samples. In 
contrast, in the current research, a community sample was used. It is 
possible that individuals in a community member sample felt less 
social normative pressure than their student sample counterparts. 
This may have weakened the effect of subjective norms within the 
model, resulting in a non-significant effect.
This research examined for the first time the role of moral norms 
in the prediction of intentions to fake in psychological testing. In line 
with previous research investigating intentions towards value-laden 
behaviors (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Elliott & Thomson, 2010; Godin et al., 
2005; Nemme & White, 2010; Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995; 
White et al., 2009), moral obligation significantly predicted intention 
to engage in faking. Low personal moral obligation to suppress faking 
behavior revealed the highest correlation with intention to fake, 
indicating that a positive view of the morality of faking increases 
intention to fake. Overall, these results suggest that the predictive 
value of moral obligation generalises to the faking context and 
supports the utility of distinguishing between normative types in the 
domain of psychological assessment. It is therefore recommended 
that moral obligation be measured separately to other normative 
influences when using the TPB to predict faking and similar 
intentions. 
The findings regarding the function of moral norms in intentions 
to fake in psychological testing have implications within test 
administration settings. Some research has suggested that warnings 
(suggesting that individuals may or will be caught) as useful prior to 
(Schenk & Sullivan, 2010) or during (Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 
2011) psychological testing in order to reduce response distortion. It 
is feasible that moral norms could be used to inform the kind of 
warnings given in psychological testing, in order to enhance deterring 
effects.
At the bivariate level, the correlation between ethical relativism 
and intention to fake was weak. Ethical idealism was significantly 
negatively correlated with intention to fake, suggesting that 
participants who believe in good consequences resulting from a 
morally ‘right’ action are less likely to fake. However, despite this 
significant bivariate relationship, the contribution of ethical idealism 
within the multivariate model was not significant. The null results 
regarding the role of ethical position in predicting faking intentions 
is difficult to explain. With a sample size exceeding Green’s (1991) 
recommendations for assessing the contribution of individual 
predictors in multiple regression, it would seem that the null results 
Table 2
Bivariate correlations
Intention to 
fake
Attitude Perceived 
behavioral control
Subjective norm Moral obligation 
norm
Ethical idealism Ethical 
relativism
Intention to fake 1.00 .55*** .61*** .25*** .73*** -.24*** .09
Attitude 1.00 .28*** .39*** .52*** -.26*** .08
Perceived behavioral control 1.00 .32*** .45*** -.26*** .05
Subjective norm 1.00 .43*** -.15* .08
Moral obligation norm 1.00 -.24*** .16*
Ethical idealism 1.00 .01
Ethical relativism 1.00
.*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 3
 Hierarchical Multiple Regression
b Std. error Beta t-statistic
Step 1 Constant -.25 0.61 -4.16
Attitude .23 0.03 .40  7.67***
Perceived behavioral control .37 0.04 .49 9.74***
Subjective norm .06 0.08 .04 0.74
Step 2 Constant -.27 0.51 -0.54
Attitude .12 0.03 .22 4.59***
Perceived behavioral control .26 0.03 .35 7.78***
Subjective norm -.08 0.07 -.05 -1.13
Moral obligation norm .89 0.09 .48 9.41***
Step 3 Constant -.43 1.08 0.39
Attitude .13 0.03 .22 4.57***
Perceived behavioral control .26 0.03 .35 7.70***
Subjective norm -.08 0.07 -.05 -1.12
Moral obligation norm .89 0.10 .49 9.36***
Ethical idealism .04 0.10 .02 0.37
Ethical relativism -.04 0.09 -.02 -0.38
*p <. 05, **p < .01, *** p< .001
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regarding were not due to insufficient power. Attention must then 
turn to the nature of the constructs themselves. It would seem that 
within the context of a TPB derived model, ethical position may have 
only limited utility in the prediction of faking intentions. Iverson 
(2007) identified numerous complex and interactive factors that 
may motivate faking behaviors, several of which may be pertinent to 
ethical position (for example greed, justification, and entitlement) 
and social or moral norms (for example secondary gain and reinforced 
behavior patterns). It is therefore possible that within the 
psychosocial context of the TPB model it was difficult to accurately 
explore the potential interactions and bidirectional associations 
between motivations and ethical idealism. Given the likely conceptual 
value of ethical idealism in predicting faking intentions, and the 
bivariate relationship involved, it seems possible that the TPB 
constructs may have absorbed the contribution of ethical idealism. It 
is also possible that ethically relativistic individuals were ambivalent 
regarding faking intention as it was operationalised here, perhaps 
requiring more information (e.g., how badly do I need this job?) 
before determining their willingness to engage in faking in 
psychological assessment.
Still, it remains that a number of additional constructs may be 
useful to consider in future research investigating intentions to fake 
in psychological assessment. For example, socially desirable 
responding is associated with a tendency to enhance the self (Holden, 
2007). Given the influence of social desirability in self-presentation, 
considering the role of individual differences such as these in 
predicting faking intentions may provide additional insight.
Additional Considerations and Limitations
This research was conducted entirely using self-report. It is 
therefore feasible that common-method variance may have 
influenced findings. However, given ethical relativism’s weak 
correlation with the other variables, it seems unlikely that 
measurement error, if present, was systematic.
This study addressed generic faking intentions. Future research 
would benefit from delineating intentions to fake in specific faking 
situations (for example, an unemployed vs. incumbent applicant). It 
is possible that the role of moral obligation norms and ethical 
position (or indeed variables such as social desirability, as noted 
above) may be more salient depending on the faking scenario. It is 
therefore recommended that future studies explore intentions in a 
range of specific faking contexts in order to identify specific 
predictors.
Finally, it is important that future studies explore whether the 
TPB model improves prediction of actual faking behavior, as well as 
faking intention. However, as individuals rarely admit to faking in 
non-analogue situation (Hall, Thompson, & Poirier, 2007; Morel & 
Marshman, 2008; Taylor, Frueh, & Asmundson, 2007), 
operationalisation of this aspect of the model may prove challenging. 
Still, given the well-established role of intention as a precursor to 
behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), it remains that identification of 
the predictors of intention to fake in psychological testing is 
indicated.
Conclusion
Outcomes of psychological testing have important consequences 
in a range of domains, such as vocational, clinical, and forensic 
contexts, with psychological test results informing a number of 
possibly life-altering decisions (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2010). 
However, to date, firm understanding of the antecedents of faking 
behavior is limited, with most research presenting theoretical 
perspectives rather than empirical evidence. This research aimed to 
address this problem by empirically examining constructs drawn 
from sound theoretical positions.
This research examined for the first time the role of attitude, 
perceived behavioral control, subjective norms, moral obligation, 
and ethical ideology in the prediction of intention to fake. A 
favourable attitude toward faking, a high level of perceived behavioral 
control over faking, and a low level of moral obligation to suppress 
faking behavior contributed strongly to the prediction of intention to 
fake on a psychological test. 
The current model supports the previous findings (McFarland & 
Ryan, 2006) regarding the overall contribution made by attitude, 
perceived behavioral control, and subjective norm regarding 
intention to fake. However, importantly the current findings extend 
understanding by highlighting the utility of the inclusion of personal 
moral obligation norms in research of this nature. It would seem 
that, in the context of faking, an integration of the theoretical 
approaches regarding morality (e.g., Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Snell et al., 
1999) and the TPB is indicated. Specifically, it would seem that 
consideration of morality in the form of normative beliefs is of value, 
over and above the traditional TPB approach using subjective norms.
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